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Contreras-Buenfil v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
712 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1983)
In May 1971, Florentino Contreras-Buenfil left Mexico and il-
legally entered the United States, leaving behind his wife and four
children. He lived with Flora Lopez continuously since 1975. To-
gether they supported two children-Flora's son, Jose, from a prior
relationship, and a daughter, Carol, who was fathered by Con-
treras-Buenfil.
In 1979, Contreras-Buenfil came before an immigration judge
in a deportation hearing. He conceded deportability, but con-
tended that deportation would cause hardship, and therefore,
should be suspended. The Immigration Judge held that, because
Contreras-Buenfil and Flora were not married, he could not base
his application for a suspension of deportation on the allegedly re-
sulting hardship to either Jose or Carol. He appealed, stating that
the court had erred in refusing to consider the hardship he would
suffer resulting from the separation from his California family. The
Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal stating that,
except for his infant daughter, all his family ties were in Mexico.
The court of appeals in reviewing the case stated that al-
though the grant of a suspension of deportation for hardship is dis-
cretionary, a court may reverse the Board's denial of relief if the
exercise of its discretion was "arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to
law."1 Denial of relief is deemed arbitrary if important factors
which are relevant to a hardship determination are not considered.
Therefore, the Board of Immigration Appeals must state and sup-
port its reasons for denying relief.
The court of appeals, in remanding the case, stated that the
Immigration Judge and the Board did not err in refusing to con-
sider the potential hardship to Flora or Jose. This notion was pre-
mised on the fact that Flora was in the United States illegally and
also because Jose was not Contreras-Buenfil's "child," as defined
1. Santana-Figuoroa v. I.N.S., 644 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1981).
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in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(c). Consequently, the Board should have
considered the hardship that the separation from Flora and Jose
would cause Contreras-Buenfil. Additionally, the Board failed to
consider the effect of the separation upon Contreras-Buenfil's
daughter, Carol.
Jean v. Nelson
711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983)
This case involved an appeal from the United States District
Court order releasing over one thousand Haitian immigrants held
in detention by the United States Government. Pursuant to a new
policy, Haitians were detained in camps and prisons pending a
final determination of their rights to remain in this country. The
district court held that the government has violated the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act by failing to engage in notice and comment
rulemaking, thereby voiding the detention policy and reinstating a
prior policy of parole. It further held that the plaintiffs had failed
to prove their discrimination claim.
The court of appeals remanded the case, although the ultimate
result remained the same, providing for such relief as was neces-
sary to remedy the discrimination and effectuate the rationale of
its decision. The court stated that the executive branch has full
authority to protect and control the national borders. They contin-
ued by noting that Congress has empowered the executive to adopt
policies necessary to this objective in the area of immigration.
Therefore, the policy change from one of ready parole with limited
exceptions, to detention with limited exceptions, was properly
within the realm of executive decision-making.
The court affirmed the lower court's determination that notice
and comment rulemaking was required. The individuals responsi-
ble for defining the scope of the policy had failed to do so, leaving
those who implemented the policy to apply a "binding norm" of
widespread detention of Haitians. The court of appeals then found
the district court's conclusion that the enforcement of the new pol-
icy did not discriminate against the plaintiffs to be clearly errone-
ous. It was noted that although the executive branch has the power
to protect the borders and ensure the orderly entrance of aliens,
those policies must be administered in a non-discriminatory
fashion.
In remanding the case, the court stated that the relief shall
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include, but is not limited to: (1) an injunction against discrimina-
tory enforcement of the new policy; (2) the continued parole of
class members; (3) record keeping requirements so the district
court may ensure the policy is effectuated in the future in a non-
discriminatory manner; (4) such relief as is necessary to resolve the
asylum and access issues; and (5) whatever further relief is neces-
sary to ensure that all aliens, regardless of nationality or origin, are
accorded equal treatment.
II. ANTIDUMPING LAWS
Zenith Radio Corp. v. U.S.
710 F.2d 806 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
On June 5, 1981, the United States Department of Commerce
issued an annual review determination pursuant to section 751 of
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. These yearly determinations
establish the margins used in calculating dumping duties and are
used to estimate the amount that importers must deposit to cover
entries after the review period. Zenith, a United States manufac-
turer of television receivers, challenged the determination for the
1979-80 review period which reduced the margins for assessing
dumping duties on entries of Japanese television receivers.
Zenith moved for an injunction to prevent liquidation of the
merchandise entries occurring during the 1979-80 period. The trial
court denied the request on the sole ground that Zenith failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of the
injunction. On appeal, Zenith claimed: (1) that the trial court
abused its discretion in considering only irreparable injury as a
factor for the injunction and (2) that irreparable injury would in
fact occur. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that liquidation of the
entries would eliminate Zenith's only remedy, i.e., a correct margin
on the 1979-80 entries. Noting that Zenith had a strong and com-
petitive commercial stake in insuring that its competitors abide by
all monetary sanctions, the court distinguished this case from
others by asserting that an injury to the domestic television indus-
try caused by the dumping of Japanese imports had already been
established. In addition, the court recognized that the United
States has a desire to continue enforcing American antidumping
laws stringently. Having decided that irreparable harm would oc-
cur, the court remanded the case to the lower court to consider the
1983]
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likelihood of success, the benefit to the public interest and the
hardship to the petitioner in conjunction with irreparable harm.
III. CUSTOMS DUTIES
Industrial Fasteners Group, American Importers Assn. v. United
States
710 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
An American importers association challenged the standard
used by the International Trade Administration (ITA) to impose
countervailing duties. Countervailing duties are duties imposed in
an amount equal to the amount of the net "subsidy" paid by a
foreign government, when export payments made by that govern-
ment are determined to be subsidies rather than nonexcessive re-
bates of indirect taxes paid. The three-prong test set forth by the
International Trade Administration was: (1) whether the foreign
government's program operates for the purpose of rebating indirect
taxes; (2) whether there is a link between eligibility for the pay-
ments and the payment of indirect taxes; and (3) whether the for-
eign government has reasonably calculated and documented the
actual indirect taxes.
Using this test, the International Trade Administration found
that the Government of India, through a Ministry of Commerce
policy, provided subsidies to exporters of industrial fasteners. The
Court of International Trade affirmed the ITA's duty determina-
tion and the importers association sought review of the decision.
The two major arguments raised by the appellees were, first,
whether the ITA test was reasonable and, second, whether the test
deprived importers of due process.
The court of appeals affirmed both the ITA's imposition of
countervailing duties and the decision of the Court of International
Trade. It held that the test was a reasonable interpretation of the
countervailing duty statutes. Specific directives by the ITA con-
cerning the need for actual proof of the foreign government's cal-
culations provided adequate notice of the requirements and did
not deprive the importers of due process. The foreign government
had not sustained its burden of proving that the calculations were
reasonable by simply stating that the eligibility of exporters to re-
ceive a refund of indirect taxes paid was based upon a reasonable
calculation. Consequently, the court concluded that the appellees
did not provide adequate information to permit a determination
[Vol. 15:2
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that the payments were not a subsidy and therefore, the payments
were subject to countervailing duty treatment.
Maple Leaf Co. v. United States
566 F. Supp. 879 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983)
An importer of frozen and breaded mushrooms brought an ac-
tion for a reliquidation of entries and a refund of the supplemental
duties actually paid. Pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No.
4801, October 29, 1980, granting import relief under the escape
clause of the Trade Act, supplemental duties are applied when a
domestic industry is threatened by the importation of competitive
articles in increased quantities.
Plaintiff sought: (1) review of the International Trade Com-
mission's finding that frozen mushrooms should be treated as
canned mushrooms for import purposes under item 144.20 of the
Tariff Schedule of the U.S.; and (2) a restriction of the President's
Proclamation granting import relief to imported canned mush-
rooms only. The importer argued that assessing the same duties on
both frozen and canned mushrooms was unlawful since there was
no evidence to support the International Trade Commission's find-
ing and that without such support, the President's Proclamation
was ultra vires. In its motion to dismiss, the defendant raised the
defenses of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
In denying the motion to dismiss, the Court of International
Trade held that it did have subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 158(a), since the importer had filed protests against liqui-
dations assessing duties and had sought reliquidation of such du-
ties. The court considered the crucial question to be whether the
exercise of discretionary authority conferred upon both the Inter-
national Trade Commission and the President is subject to judicial
review. The court found that in the absence of a statute precluding
judicial review, such review is permitted, although limited to the
question of whether the action conformed to the procedural re-
quirements of statutory authority or whether there had been an
administrative abuse of discretion.
1983]
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IV. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
Swearingen v. United States
565 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1983)
Richard and Betty Swearingen filed suit to recover taxes ille-
gally or erroneously assessed by the United States. The plaintiffs
resided in the Panama Canal Zone during the 1979 tax year and
they received income as a result of their employment with the
Panama Canal Commission. The couple was taxed for the 1979 tax
year. In 1980, they filed a refund claim for taxes assessed on those
wages earned between October 1 and December 31. Their claim
rested on two arguments and provisions of the Panama Canal
Treaty (the treaty): (1) paragraph 9 of article III of the treaty,
which states that the status of United States employees in Panama
will be governed by the Agreement in Implementation of this arti-
cle, and (2) paragraph 2 of article XV of the Agreement which,
inter alia, purports to exempt citizen employees from any taxes on
income received as a result of work for the Commission. Both par-
ties filed motions for summary judgment.
On review of the motions, the district court held that the
Agreement in Implementation was essentially an international ex-
ecutive agreement. As such, it is not recognized as the law of the
land and is void when in conflict with a Congressional statute. The
court found that section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
provides for the taxation of all income from whatever source de-
rived, was the functional equivalent of a treaty since Congressional
ratification was necessary for its implementation. An executive
agreement, on the other hand, requires no ratification and is not
authorized or described by the United States Constitution.
In addressing the question of whether the Agreement was in-
corporated into the treaty by reference, the court took notice that
the President, if he had so intended, could have included the taxa-
tion exemption in the treaty. The court refused to substitute its
judgment for that of the other two branches of government in def-




Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico
565 F. Supp. 963 (D.P.R. 1983)
Members of Puerto Rico's integrated bar association brought
suit under § 1983 U.S.C.A., challenging various Puerto Rican stat-
utes which mandated that its members belong to, and financially
support, an organization which promoted ideological causes con-
trary to its members' personal beliefs. The United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico held that the statutes as ap-
plied and enforced violated the first amendment freedoms of
speech and association. The statutes also violated the fifth and
fourteenth amendment rights to be free from state coercion against
the individual's right to support ideological or political causes.
The court stressed that the organization in issue, which was
purportedly designed to aid in the administration of justice, un-
questionably participated in ideological or political activities on a
continuing basis. The court noted, however, that these activities
had no relationship to the stated legislative purpose for which it
was created. As such, the court enjoined Puerto Rican authorities
from taking any action against persons refusing to associate with
the organization. Likewise, the court enjoined officials from using
any public funds on behalf of the organization until the organiza-
tion ceased to engage in ideological activism. Because of the vague
nature of the claim for damages, however, the court limited the
award to nominal damages.
VI. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Bally/Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Regan
565 F. Supp. 1045 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983)
In January 1981, Plaintiff, Bally/Midway, owner of copyrights
on "Pac-Man" video games, recorded those copyrights with cus-
toms. In early 1983, several importations of hand held games were
released to an importer. These were suspected of being pirated
copies of the forementioned copyrights. Bally/Midway examined
the merchandise and informed customs that the games infringed
their copyrights. The importer did not return the goods within the
thirty days allowed by law, and was therefore assessed a penalty.
The owner brought this action against the Secretary of the Trea-
sury and the Commissioner of Customs in the Court of Interna-
19831
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tional Trade.
The defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the Court of In-
ternational Trade and argued that under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, district
courts have original jurisdiction in copyright cases and that such
jurisdiction is exclusive. The owner claimed that the court had ju-
risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h), on the grounds that the mer-
chandise was subject to an embargo or other qualitative
restrictions.
The court found that where goods have already been imported
into the United States, reliance on § 1581 is misplaced because
that section confers jurisdiction only in pre-importation rulings by
the Secretary of the Treasury. Since no statute conferring exclu-
sive jurisdiction was met, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction
and ordered the cause transferred to the appropriate district court
with instructions to proceed as if the cause had been initiated
there.
VII. JURISDICTION OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
Itel Corporation v. MIS Victoria U (Ex Pishtaz Iran)
710 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1983)
A domestic corporation and its foreign subsidiary brought suit
against another domestic corporation alleging a breach of leases for
cargo containers and related equipment. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana stayed the pro-
ceedings to permit the action to be heard before the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal. This result was premised on the fact that
the defendant had a third party claim against Iran Express Lines
for which it had allegedly acted, and which was deemed to be a
necessary party. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit vacated the stay to permit adjudication of claims
not asserted against Iran Express Lines.
Noting that the tribunal was formed following the 1981 Ira-
nian hostage crisis, the court stressed that only claims against Iran
and claims of Iranian nationals against the United States fall
within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court held that
the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the action because neither
the plaintiff nor defendant corporations were Iranian. In addition,
the district court did not even determine that Iran Express Lines
was an Iranian corporation or had been nationalized by Iran. The
[Vol. 15:2
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court also held that Iran Express Lines was not a necessary party
to the action because a judgment in its absence would not be prej-
udicial to that party.
VIII. TREATIES
Taylor v. United States
711 F.2d 1199 (3rd Cir. 1983)
Orville Taylor, a United States Navy ensign, was scheduled for
discharge on December 30, 1979. In October of 1977, while sta-
tioned in Spain, Taylor was involved in an off-base automobile ac-
cident which resulted in the death of a Spanish citizen. When
Spain refused to waive jurisdiction, Taylor was indicted by Span-
ish authorities for involuntary manslaughter. No military charges
were filed. He was found guilty and sentenced to eighteen months
in prison, whereupon Spain requested that the Navy surrender the
serviceman to Spanish authorities so that they could begin his sen-
tence. Although Taylor's enlistment had expired, he was not dis-
charged. Instead, the Navy unilaterally and involuntarily extended
the serviceman's enlistment pursuant to Article 3840260(5)(h) of
the Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual.
On June 9, 1980, Taylor filed suit alleging that the extension
constituted an unconstitutional detention. He therefore sought an
injunction which would prevent his surrender to Spain and order
his release. On July 15, 1980, the injunction was granted. The
United States appealed the order, alleging that it had legal author-
ity to extend Taylor's enlistment under 10 U.S.C. §§ 506 and
671(a) (1976) and article XVIII of the Agreement in Implementa-
tion of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain
and the United States.2 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit affirmed.
In considering the Government's claim under title 10, which
expressly authorizes involuntary extensions of enlistments by the
military during times of war, the court found that no mention is
made of naval authority to involuntarily extend individual enlist-
ments when a serviceman stationed in a foreign country is subject
to that country's criminal prosecution. According to the language
of the agreement, the court looked at whether a serviceman whose
term has expired but has not yet received a discharge is a member
2. 27 U.S.T. 3095, T.I.A.S. No. 8361.
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of the United States personnel in Spain who is legally subject to
detention by the United States military authorities. It found that
although the obligation to surrender the serviceman was not de-
feated by the expiration of his enlistment, the surrender could not
be facilitated by an involuntary extension of his enlistment. The
court did note, however, that the Navy should have surrendered
Taylor to the Spanish authorities prior to the expiration of the
enlistment.
